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Abstract: This paper analyses the factors that determine solid waste 
service costs. The empirical analysis is based on information derived 
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inhabitants, such that cooperation between these municipalities could lead 
to cost savings. It also appears that private delivery is not cheaper than 
public delivery. Finally, designating a larger proportion of the total waste 
volume to recycling does not imply greater costs.
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1. Introduction 
In recent years solid waste services have undergone operational reorganization in many 
countries. This organizational change has gone hand in hand with increasing calls for better 
functioning and results, not only in terms of tailoring services to improve the quality of 
everyday life in urban centers but also as a consequence of greater concern over sustainability 
and environmental protection. However, despite the extent of changes to these services very 
few empirical analyses have been conducted as regards their economic aspects, this being 
especially the case outside the USA.  
The present study aims to provide a detailed empirical analysis of the factors that determine 
solid waste service costs. Attention is focused on municipalities in metropolitan areas of the 
Spanish region of Galicia, and the analysis is based on information derived from a survey of 65 
such municipalities. Cost structure is studied in order to explain the variability between 
municipalities as regards service costs. To this end, a function of municipal costs is determined 
and estimated parametrically. The results of the empirical analysis enable us to study the 
existence of economies of scale with respect to output, as well as the effect of certain factors 
directly related to the service, for example, the proportion of selective waste, the frequency of 
collection or the existence of municipal incineration plants. The paper also analyses the impact 
on costs of other local factors such as seasonal variations and the form of service production. 
2. Empirical background on estimates of solid waste costs 
The empirical literature regarding factors that might explain solid waste service costs dates 
back to the mid 1960s. Given the progressive improvement in available databases, as well as in 
the econometric techniques used, it is worthwhile reviewing this literature in chronological 
order. Thus, the next section begins by considering the pioneering studies, especially that of 
Hirsch (1965), who was the first author to make an important methodological contribution. 
Attention then shifts to the second generation of research, particularly the work of Stevens 
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(1978), who made substantial improvements to the model of Hirsch (1965), and that of Dubin 
and Navarro (1988), whose paper also includes methodological innovations. Finally, the 
review looks at studies published over the last decade and which have used more robust 
statistical methods and more detailed databases. Therefore, each of these more recent studies is 
considered in greater detail. 
2.1. Pioneering studies 
The first empirical study to use econometric analysis to determine, among other things, 
whether the form of service delivery (public or private) had an effect on municipal costs was 
that of Hirsch (1965), who sampled 24 municipalities in St. Louis County (Missouri). Although 
he started from a more ambitious model in terms of explanatory variables his empirical study 
was limited by the data available in 1960, the year for which he obtained information. 
Therefore, the variables that were finally used to explain costs (taken as mean costs per 
service) were the number of collection units, the weekly collection frequency, whether the 
collection point was individual or collective, the residential density, the type of service 
financing (general budget or specific tax) and the form of service management, distinguishing 
between municipal and private delivery. Following his empirical analysis, Hirsch (1965) found 
no significant differences in service costs between municipal and private delivery. 
Interestingly, neither did he find any economies of scale with respect to output (hereinafter, 
economies of scale) in the service.1 
The model proposed by Hirsch (1965) was, with slight variations, followed in subsequent 
studies by Kitchen (1976) in Canada, Kemper and Quigley (1976) and Collins and Downes 
(1977) in the USA, and Pommerehne and Frey (1977) in Switzerland. Except for the study by 
                                                 
1 In this regard it is worth clarifying a methodological aspect. Economies of scale imply that mean costs 
fall as output rises, whereas economies of density refer to variations in mean costs with respect to 
changes in the concentration of the population served. 
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Collins and Downes (1977) all these papers argue that private delivery has significantly lower 
costs.  
2.2 Second generation of research
The models specified in the abovementioned studies were highly preliminary, and the research 
was also subject to important limitations due to the lack of data. However, toward the end of 
the 1970s a number of studies appeared that used increasingly better quality data (for example, 
the amount of waste generated) and/or more robust statistical techniques.  
The study by Stevens (1978) was an important step forward in terms of the quality of both 
model specification and the data used. This author sampled 340 private firms and public 
entities that provided a solid waste service to 340 cities distributed across the whole of the 
USA. The study considered questions related to the form of production (competitive markets 
with private agreements between families and private providers, public monopoly or private 
monopoly under contract to the municipality), and also took a more formal approach to issues 
regarding economies of density. Stevens took as her explained variable the total service cost, 
while the explanatory variables were the amount of waste generated, a wage index for the 
sector, the form of production (private or public), the market structure (competitive or 
monopoly), the frequency of collection, the amount of waste per inhabitant, the population 
density and the variability in climatic conditions. The empirical findings reported by Stevens 
(1978) show the existence of positive economies of scale in less-populated municipalities, but 
there was no evidence of economies of density. Furthermore, the frequency of collection and 
wage indicators were found to have a positive influence on costs, whereas variations in climate 
had no effect.  
Finally, with respect to the form of provision, private provision with competition between 
firms was significantly more expensive than a monopoly approach, regardless of whether the 
latter was public or private. As regards the comparison between public monopoly and private 
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monopoly, Stevens (1978) found that with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants there were no 
significant differences between the two kinds of production forms, whereas above 50,000 
inhabitants private monopolies were associated with lower costs than public ones.2 
The model proposed by Stevens (1978) was widely followed in the literature, it being 
applied with very few variations by Tickner and McDavid (1986) in Canada — where the 
authors report lower costs for private delivery — and by Domberger, Meadowcroft and 
Thompson (1986) in the UK, where no difference was found between the cost of public and 
private delivery when a competitive tendering system was in place. 
Dubin and Navarro (1988) address the same questions as were considered by Stevens (1978) 
and Tickner and McDavis (1986). Using the same sample as in the study by Stevens, and with 
complete data for 261 municipalities, Dubin and Navarro took as their explained variable the 
average service cost, while the explanatory variables considered were the amount of waste 
collected per household, the market structure (private, franchise-based or municipal provision, 
regardless of whether the latter was based on public delivery or contracting out), the frequency 
of collection, whether collection was from homes or waste deposit points, the population 
density and the variability in climatic conditions. The empirical results reported by Dubin and 
Navarro coincide with those of Stevens as regards the existence of positive economies of scale 
in municipalities with fewer than 20,000 inhabitants, although the importance of these 
economies of scale was very limited. With more than 20,000 inhabitants the economies of scale 
no longer held true, and neither did the authors find any direct evidence of economies of 
                                                 
2 The results obtained when segmenting the municipalities by population size led Stevens (1978) to 
propose the existence of a structural change in the equation that would make the sample aggregation 
incorrect, although she found no solid statistical evidence of this. 
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density.3 Moreover, the greater the collection frequency the higher the costs, whereas the latter 
were reduced when waste was collected from deposit points. Variations in temperature had no 
significant effect. As regards the type of provision, the most expensive was the private 
approach, followed by a private monopoly with franchising (Dubin & Navarro, 1988). The 
least expensive forms of service were those based on contracting out and municipal provision. 
Finally, these authors also studied the suggestion made by Stevens (1978) regarding a 
structural change in the cost equation according to population size, but found no evidence to 
reject the hypothesis of structural stability in this equation.  
In line with the research by Domberger, Meadowcroft and Thompson (1986), a subsequent 
study by Szymanski and Wilkins (1993) used information about municipalities in England and 
Wales with samples covering the five-year period from 1984 to 1988. They found no 
significant difference in the costs of public and private delivery when a competitive tendering 
system was in place. Finally, Szymanski (1996) reported that tenders awarded to private firms 
led to greater cost savings than did those won by public bodies. However, in both cases the 
advantages of competitive tendering diminished over time, this occurring more quickly in the 
case of tenders awarded to public firms as compared with those won by private firms. 
2.3. The most recent studies 
In recent years a number of empirical studies have been published which use not only more 
detailed data about solid waste services but also progressively more sophisticated statistical 
techniques. 
                                                 
3 With respect to economies of density, Dubin and Navarro (1988) consider the possible correlation 
between population density and the type of service organization, which could affect the consistency of 
the density estimate and explain its lack of significance in previous studies. After correcting their model 
with the effect of the market structure they found positive economies of density.  
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Reeves and Barrow (2000) worked with a sample of 48 municipalities in Ireland and used 
information covering the years 1993, 1994 and 1995. Taking as their explained variable the 
total cost of waste services they considered a series of explanatory variables related to output 
and other service characteristics such as the number of collection units (approximation to 
output), as well as variables regarding service frequency, the type of collection, the importance 
of costs derived from selective waste, residential density, and whether or not delivery was 
public or private. On the basis of their empirical analysis Reeves and Barrow (2000) argue that 
private delivery was associated with cost savings in each of the years studied, and also that 
these savings were very high. 
Callan and Thomas (2001) considered the possible multi-product nature of solid waste 
services, distinguishing between their two main components: general waste for disposal and 
selective waste for recycling. The empirical analysis was based on a sample of 110 
municipalities in Massachusetts (USA), using information for the year 1997. Callan and 
Thomas estimated a two-equation model in which the explained variable was service cost (of 
disposal, on the one hand, and recycling on the other), while the explanatory variables were the 
amount of waste generated, the population density, the frequency of collection, the form of 
service delivery (public monopoly or contracting out), and the existence of a municipal dump, 
among others. In the case of waste for disposal the empirical analysis revealed economies of 
density but no economies of scale, whereas for recyclable waste there were economies of scale 
but no economies of density. The authors also found economies of scope for both disposal and 
recycling services. A greater collection frequency was associated with higher costs in both 
cases, while the existence of a municipal dump reduced costs. Finally, the form of delivery had 
no effect on cost (Callan & Thomas, 2001). 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) studied solid waste service costs in a sample of 85 
municipalities in the Netherlands for the period 1996-97. Taking total service cost as their 
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explained variable the authors assumed coverage of 100% by means of taxes and estimated 
costs as the product of service taxes and the number of households. The variables used to 
explain total costs were related to service output, for example, the number of collection points, 
the density of collection points and the type of collection. They also considered the frequency 
of service and variables that reflect recycling characteristics such as the percentage of glass, 
paper and organic matter. Finally, a distinction was made between public and private service 
delivery. This study also made use of the Chow test, which measures the structural stability of 
cost equations. Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) compared the structural stability of the cost 
equation for both the size of municipality and the form of delivery. As regards costs according 
to the model of delivery the authors found that contracting out was associated with lower costs, 
although there were no significant differences between public and private delivery in this 
respect. 
Ohlsson (2003) worked with a sample of 170 companies in 115 Swedish municipalities 
using information for the year 1989. In order to explain total costs Ohlsson considered 
explanatory variables related to the product (amount collected, frequency of service), the 
distance covered by waste transport, the price of inputs (labour and capital) and the form of 
delivery. The author then compared the stability of the cost equation for the different forms of 
delivery. This comparison is indeed important because if, as Ohlsson found, there is structural 
instability between public and private delivery, then a dummy variable according to the form of 
production would constitute an incorrect specification for the cost comparison. In all other 
respects, and as in the abovementioned studies, Ohlsson specified a cost function akin to that 
proposed by Stevens (1978). The study also applied various technical corrections to increase 
the robustness of the econometric estimate. The results obtained suggest that public delivery is 
cheaper than a private service (Ohlsson, 2003).  
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 The studies by Bel (2006) and Bel and Costas (2006) constitute the first econometric 
analyses in Spain of the municipal costs of solid waste services. The research used a sample of 
186 municipalities in Catalonia and the information gathered was for the year 2000. In order to 
explain the total cost of solid waste services, these works consider variables related to the 
volume of product (amount of waste generated), the price of inputs (wage costs), certain 
characteristics of the product (frequency of the service, availability of dumping sites, form of 
production, i.e. public or private), and certain uncontrollable characteristics that affect the 
service, such as population density and the strength of the tourist factor. In general, these 
explanatory factors are in line with those used in the abovementioned studies, although the 
specification of a tourism variable, based on the degree of such activity, is a novelty in the 
literature. The empirical analysis found significant economies of scale in the less-populated 
municipalities. However, the strength of these economies of scale was limited and, indeed, 
both their intensity and significance disappeared as population increased. In fact, the test of 
structural change indicated the advisability of studying larger municipalities separately from 
smaller ones. As regards the association between form of production and service costs there 
were no significant differences between public and private delivery.  
Finally, Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2007) analysed the factors which determined the total costs 
of waste services in 453 municipalities in the Netherlands for the year 2002. This study used 
the same control variables as those employed by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) to explain total 
costs of service delivery at the municipal level: number of collection points, density of 
collection points, type of collection, frequency of service, characteristics of recycling, and form 
of production. Additionally, they included a series of concentration indicators at the provincial 
level to analyze the extent to which the strength of competition affects the impact of 
contracting out on costs, taking into account that in the Netherlands contracting out may 
involve both public and private companies. The concentration indicators used were the 
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Hirschman-Herfindahl index, the C3-ratio (the market share of the three largest companies) 
and the presence of competitors (private or public) in municipalities within the same 
geographical area. Although the results for the other explanatory variables were very similar to 
those reported by Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) the authors found evidence to suggest that cost 
savings with contracting out depended on the degree of concentration at the provincial level: 
the greater the concentration the lower the cost savings associated with contracting out. In 
addition, they found that the presence of public (but not private) companies as competitors in 
neighboring municipalities seemed to have a positive effect on the cost savings achieved with 
contracting out. 
 
3. The model for analyzing solid waste service costs in Galicia 
Having reviewed the published multivariate empirical studies it is now possible to propose a 
general model for estimating the factors that determine solid waste service costs:  
g = f (q, p, x, z), 
where g is the municipal cost (cost borne by the municipality), q is the volume of output, p is 
the price of inputs, x the characteristics of output, and z the uncontrollable characteristics that 
affect the service.  
In order to conduct the empirical analysis on the basis of this general model it is necessary 
to have data regarding the target variables for a broad sample of Galician municipalities. The 
empirical model to be estimated is as follows, taking logarithms of both the dependent variable 
and the explanatory variables:  
LCT =  + 1LOUTPUT + 2LPERSELECT + 3LFREC + 4LTURIS + 5LPLANTS +   
              6LWAGES+ 7DPRIV+                                                                                 (1) 
In this equation the dependent variable is the total cost of service delivery, LCT. Insofar as 
the cost data for municipalities using private delivery are provided by local government, these 
are costs incurred by the municipality, and thus we are dealing with municipal costs or 
 11
spending rather than production technical costs. Here, service is understood to mean the set of 
activities implied by this term: a) collection; b) transport; and c) disposal (dumping or 
incineration) or recycling (valorization). Also included are the following explanatory variables 
with respect to municipal costs or spending: 
1) LOUPUT. Volume of waste collected in the municipality, expressed in kilos. One 
would expect to find a positive relationship between the volume of waste generated and total 
costs. Therefore, the coefficient associated with this variable should be positive. In fact, the 
volume of waste generated should be the main factor determining the total cost incurred by 
the corresponding municipality. However, the value of the coefficient associated with this 
variable will determine whether or not there are economies of scale. In the event that this 
value is less than 1, and significantly so, this would provide evidence that costs increase less 
than proportionally with increases in output.  
2) LPERSELECT. Percentage of the total waste volume that is designated for recycling. 
Except for those municipalities with the largest population (over 50,000 inhabitants) it has 
been possible to gather separate information regarding waste sent for disposal (dumping or 
incineration) and that sent for recycling (selective waste). One would expect to find a positive 
relationship between the percentage of waste designated for recycling and costs, such that the 
coefficient of this variable should be positive.  
3) LFREC. The frequency of waste collection, in other words, the number of days per 
week on which waste is collected. Given the findings of previous studies this variable is 
expected to show a positive effect on costs.  
4) LTURIS. Level of tourist activity in the municipality. This variable aims to reflect the 
influence on costs of seasonal variation in the generation of solid waste. Indeed, during the 
tourist season it may be necessary to take on extra staff and this introduces some instability 
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into service production. Hence the coefficient associated with this variable is expected to be 
positive.  
5) LPLANTS. Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the event that there is an 
incineration plant within the municipal district, and 0 otherwise. The existence of an 
incineration plant within the municipal district may enable the cost of transporting waste 
from collection points to the incineration site to be reduced. Therefore, the coefficient 
associated with this variable is expected to be negative.  
6) LSL. Mean wage per employee at the provincial level. The coefficient associated with 
this variable is expected to be positive, since higher wages inevitably imply higher salary 
costs.  
7) DPRIV. Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if delivery has been contracted out to a 
private firm, and 0 in all other possible scenarios: a) local government provides the service 
directly (waste management department or independent body); (b) the service is provided by 
a municipal company (subject to private law). It is not clear what the expected effect of this 
variable should be, since the results of the literature are not conclusive. In fact, determining 
the sign of the relationship between the form of production and costs has been one of the 
aspects that have received most attention in the literature. In this regard, it is worth noting the 
high percentage of municipalities in the sample in which the service is provided by a private 
firm. Indeed, in one third of the municipalities for which information on service delivery was 
available, this service had been contracted out to private companies. 
4. Estimation and results 
The empirical analysis is based on data obtained for the year 2005. The information about 
total costs incurred by municipalities for solid waste services, as well as that referring to the 
total volume of waste generated, the existence or not of an incineration plant within the 
municipal district, the frequency of collection and the form of production was gathered via a 
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survey drawn up by a team of researchers at the Autonomous University of Madrid. The data 
obtained through this survey, which was designed especially for the present study, was 
complemented by information provided via the Survey of Equipment and Infrastructure 
conducted by Spain’s Ministry for Public Administration for municipalities of fewer than 
50,000 inhabitants. In addition, the variable regarding tourist activity refers to the indicator 
published by the Socio-economic Atlas of Galicia, using information contained in the yearbook 
of the Spanish saving bank La Caixa. This index is calculated on the basis of the revenue 
received through the business tax payable by hotels and related establishments. 
The data collection procedure yielded sufficient and complete information for 65 
municipalities in Galicia. Table 1 shows the degree to which the municipalities in the sample 
are representative of the total number in Galicia. Thus, it can be seen that information has been 
obtained for municipalities that account for 51% of the total population of this autonomous 
region of Spain.  
Insert Table 1 
Indeed, the degree of representation achieved by the sample can be considered very high 
for municipalities of more than 10,000 inhabitants, with response rates of more than 55% in 
terms of both municipalities and population. For municipalities of between 5,000 and 10,000 
inhabitants the degree of representation is adequate, at around 25% of the total for 
municipalities and population. The sample is less representative for municipalities of fewer 
than 5,000 inhabitants, and especially for those at the lower end of this band.  
Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix of the variables 
used in the empirical analysis. The range of variation in the data for each of the variables seems 
to be large enough to capture adequately their influence on the costs of solid waste collection. 
The only exception is the variable referring to wage costs in the province, where the variability 
is rather modest.  
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Insert Table 2 
Insert Table 3 
As expected, the strongest correlation is observed between the volume of waste generated 
and total costs. Moreover, it should be noted that the correlations between the explanatory 
variables used in the multivariate analysis are not too high, and therefore one would not expect 
there to be a problem of multicolinearity.  
The estimation was performed using the ordinary least squares estimator. The standard 
errors correct any problems of heteroskedasticity which may arise from the estimation of cross-
sectional data.  
Since data for the volume of selective waste were not available for municipalities with a 
large population, the estimation was performed for two different samples. The first estimation 
considered all the municipalities in the sample without including the variable referring to the 
percentage of selective waste over the total, as this was not available. In a second estimation 
we then considered all those municipalities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants and included 
the selective waste variable.  
Note that several previous studies have shown that the estimation should be made for sub-
samples of municipalities according to population bands, since the differences between large 
and small municipalities may be relevant (Bel, 2006; Bel & Costas, 2006; Dubin & Navarro, 
1988; Stevens, 1978). However, the small number of available observations did not enable 
robust estimations to be made for sub-samples of large and small municipalities.   
Tables 4 and 5 show, respectively, the results of the estimations that consider all the 
municipalities in the sample and those with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants. The explanatory 
power of the model overall is very high in both cases, since R2 is in the range of 80-85%. This 
figure is consistent with the results of previous studies. Also shown are the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) in order to determine the possible existence of multicolinearity due to an 
 15
excessive correlation between the explanatory variables. In all cases, the VIF obtained are very 
low, thus confirming that there is no problem of multicolinearity. 
Insert Table 4 
Insert Table 5 
As expected, the variable referring to the amount of waste collected is clearly significant. 
However, the most relevant aspect of this variable is not its statistical significance, but rather 
the value of its coefficient. Indeed, for there to be economies of scale the total cost must 
increase less than proportionally with respect to the volume of waste generated. Therefore, for 
economies of scale to exist this coefficient (1) must be less than 1.  
Tables 4 and 5 show the one-tailed comparison for the absence of economies of scale (Ho: 
1  1). This comparison does not confirm economies of scale when the whole sample of 
municipalities is considered. However, for those with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants there do 
seem to be economies of scale. These results are consistent with previous findings. Indeed, Bel 
(2006), Bel and Costas (2006), Callan and Thomas (2001), Dubin and Navarro (1988) and 
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) all failed to observe economies of scale when considering all  the 
municipalities sampled, whereas Bel (2006), Bel and Costas (2006), Dubin and Navarro (1988) 
and Stevens (1978) did find economies of scale when analyzing those with a lower population.   
This finding suggests that cooperation between municipalities could lead to cost savings 
insofar as this cooperation implies aggregating the volume of waste generated by each one.  
It is important to point out that the results of the estimation also suggest that private 
delivery is not necessarily cheaper than a public service. Thus, the dummy variable that takes a 
value of 1 for private delivery has a positive sign and is significant, although only at the 10% 
level, in the estimation that considers all the municipalities sampled.  
In this regard, there is no consensus in the literature about the ability of private delivery to 
reduce the costs of solid waste collection services (Bel, Hebdon and Warner, 2007; Bel & 
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Warner, 2008). A priori, private delivery should enable cost savings by taking greater 
advantage of economies of scale, by having a better incentive structure and through the 
possible introduction of competition for the contract. In the case of the present sample, 
however, it does not appear that these advantages have materialized. As such it should be taken 
into account that privatization implies additional transaction costs derived from drawing up and 
overseeing the contract with a company that is external to the municipality. Moreover, 
competition for the contract is, in many cases, limited insofar as the concentration of 
companies and the monopolization of the contract by the first incumbent are typical in this 
sector. Because of this, more importance must be given to regulatory policies (Massaruto 2007, 
Warner and Bel, 2008) and the design of regulatory institutions (Cunha Marques and Simoês 
2008). 
As regards the estimation for municipalities of fewer than 50,000 inhabitants the variable 
referring to the percentage of the total volume of waste that is designated for recycling is not 
significant. Therefore, the environmental advantages derived from promoting recycling 
activities do not seem to lead to an important increase in the cost of solid waste collection. 
Hence, the present results suggest that local government would do well to promote such 
recycling activities.   
As expected, the level of tourist activity was significantly and positively associated with 
the total cost of waste collection, as was the frequency of collection. In contrast, the existence 
of an incineration plant within the municipal district led to a significant reduction in costs. This 
was the case not only for the estimation that considered all the municipalities sampled, but also 
for that which analyzed those with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants.  
Finally, the variable referring to wage costs was not significant, probably as a result of the 
scarce variability of the sample considered. Unfortunately, data in this regard were only 
available at the provincial level, and not at the municipal level.  
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5. Conclusions 
The adequate and efficient delivery of solid waste services is of great importance in terms 
of both people’s everyday lives and local government finances. In this regard, new forms of 
organization and service delivery have been implemented in many countries in order to 
improve services.  
The present study has used an empirical analysis to identify the factors that determine the 
costs of providing solid waste collection services at the municipal level. This has been done 
using information concerning a sample of municipalities in the Spanish region of Galicia.  
The main results of the empirical analysis are as follows. Firstly, economies of scale are 
clearly available to smaller municipalities. Secondly, private delivery does not imply cost 
savings, but rather tends to increase the costs incurred by municipalities in running a solid 
waste service. Moreover, a high proportion of selective waste collection does not appear to 
increase total costs, aside from the important improvements it brings in environmental terms. 
Finally, various aspects related to the characteristics of the municipality (level of tourist 
activity, whether or not there are incineration plants) or the quality of service (frequency of 
collection) have an influence on the costs of solid waste collection services.  
In summary, there are aspects beyond the control of local government that affect the cost of 
providing a solid waste service, for example, the level of tourist activity or the size of a 
municipality’s population. However, policies designed to promote recycling do not appear to 
be too costly for local authorities. Finally, there is no evidence to suggest that private delivery 
leads to cost savings for municipalities. Beyond the debate about public versus private 
delivery, however, the setting up of cooperation agreements between municipalities may 
reduce service costs for those with small populations, insofar as they would make it possible to 
take advantage of economies of scale.  
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TABLES
Table 1. Representativeness of the sample of municipalities  
 Municipalities included in the analysis 
Number inhabitants <5.000 
5.001-
10.000 
10.001-
20.000 
20.001-
50.000 >50.000
Total
Number  
Municipalities 13 18 19 10 5 
 
65 
% over total 6.63% 28.13% 57.58% 66.67% 71.43% 20.63% 
Population 45.999 116.661 261.172 287.018 685.137 1.395.987
% over total 9.83% 26.66% 56.74% 72.06% 69.41 50.74% 
 Total municipalities of Galicia 
Number inhabitants <5.000 
5.001-
10.000 
10.001-
20.000 
20.001-
50.000 >50.000 
Total
Number  
Municipalities 196 64 33 15 7 
315 
Population 467.666 437.625 460.274 398.297 987.148 2.751.105
 Source: Own elaboration from a survey made by Autonomous University of Madrid and 
the Survey on Facilities and Infrastructures.  
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis  
Variable Media Desv. Standard Mín. Máx.  
TOTAL COST (€) 780,957.2 2,241,709 34,475.7 1.78e+07 
OUTPUT (Tm) 29,142.16 35,355.95 1,046.4 160,650 
PERSELECT* 0.23 0,11 0.06 0.59 
FREC 6.28 1.61 2 7 
TURIS 0.0013 0.0019 0.00002 0.012 
PLANTS 0.06 0.24 0 1 
WAGES 32.712,06 1.235,31 31.036 34.404 
DPRIV 0.64 0.48 0 1 
*Municipalities with less than 50000 inhabitants 
   Source: Own elaboration from a survey made by the Autonomous University of Madrid 
and the Survey on Facilities and Infrastructures.  
              
Table 3.  Correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
Note: We exclude PERSELECT since information is not available for the municipalities in the 
sample.  
Source: Own elaboration from a survey made by the Autonomous University of Madrid and the 
Survey on Facilities and Infrastructures.  
 
 
COST OUTPUT 
 
FREC TURIS WAGES PLANTS 
 
DPRIV 
COST 1       
OUTPUT 0.50 1      
FREC 0.13 0.30 1     
TURIS 0.06 0.06 -0.15 1    
WAGES -0.12 -0.44 0.04 -0.25 1   
PLANTS 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 1  
DPRIV 0.18 0.18 0.23 0.06 0.28 0.06 1 
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Table 4. Results of estimates (OLS). Sample = All the municipalities with available information 
Explanatory variables Explanatory variable: 
LCT
Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) 
LOUTPUT 0.88 (0.09)*** 1.52 
LPERSELECT - - 
LFREC 0.43 (0.14)*** 1.21 
LTURIS 0.10 (0.05)** 1.28 
LPLANTS -0.42 (0.26)* 1.02 
LWAGES -2.37 (2.16) 1.28 
DPRIV 0.33 (0.17)* 1.49 
INTERCEPT 29.89 (22.10) - 
N   
R2 
F (Joint Sign.) 
Test Ho: 1 1 
65 
0,79 
38.82*** 
1.54 
 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroscedasticity)  
Note 2: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
 
Table 5. Results of estimates (OLS). Sample = All the municipalities with available information 
with less than 50000 inhabitants 
Explanatory variables Explanatory variable: LCT Variance Inflation 
Factors (VIF) 
LOUTPUT 0.85 (0.07)*** 1.51 
LPERSELECT -0.16 (0.13) 1.40 
LFREC 0.39 (0.15)** 1.30 
LTURIS 0.12 (0.05)*** 1.22 
LPLANTS -0.53 (0.29)* 1.04 
LWAGES 0.64 (1.80) 1.61 
DPRIV 0.20 (0.15) 1.48 
INTERCEPT -1.26 (18.67) - 
N   
R2 
F (Joint Sign) 
Test Ho: 1 1 
60 
0.85 
49.29*** 
3.55** 
 
Note 1: Standard errors in parentheses (robust to heteroscedasticity ) 
Note 2: Significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*). 
 
